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FOREWORD
THE ROLE OF CONTRACT IN THE MODERN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Rachel Arnow-Richman t
A central premise underlying modern employment law is that workplace relationships, at bottom, are contracts.' Those contracts usually
begin something like this: A manager interviews an applicant. She is
pleased with the applicant's credentials and offers him a position. A
salary is named. The parties haggle, or they don't. They discuss benefits and job responsibilities, or they don't. At the end of the interaction, one thing is clear: the worker has "accepted" the "offer" of
employment-either by explicitly saying so or by showing up for work
directly thereafter. At a minimum, they have agreed to the following:
For as long as the worker performs (and the employer suffers him to
do so), he will receive his wages.
Of course, it is never that simple. Modern employment is a multifaceted relationship comprised of far more than the exchange of
money for labor. Employers typically make other commitments to
workers besides the promise of pay. They offer opportunities for extra-wage compensation and benefits, such as pensions, bonuses, and
health insurance, which are administered through written policies that
create expectations, if not legal entitlements, among participating
f Conference Chair, 2002-03; Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan School of
Law; Visiting Associate Professor 2003-04, Temple University Beasley School of Law.
J.D., Harvard Law School, L.L.M., Temple Law School. This issue of the Texas Wesleyan Law Review is the result of the influence and support of many people and
institutions. I would like to thank all of the contributors to this Symposium and to the
March 2003 Conference that preceded it: Michael Bodie, Richard Carlson, Ben Davis, Michael Green, Jill Gaulding, Monique Lillard, Orly Lobel, Anthony Niedwiecki,
Michael Maslanka, M. Scott McDonald, David Slawson, Frank Snyder, Debora
Threedy, and Marlize van Jaarsveld, as well the State Bar of Texas Labor and Employment Law Section, which provided a generous grant in support of the March program. I am most grateful to the Texas Wesleyan Law School-its faculty,
administration, students, and community-for embracing this project and helping me
to see it to fruition. In particular, I thank Dean Richard Gershon, Rita O'Donald, the
members of the 2002-03 Faculty Development Committee, and law review officers
Stephanie Councilman, Jennifer Di Fonso, Kimberly Latham, and Michael Murray.
Thank you also to Jordana Greenwald for her research assistance in connection with
the preparation of this Foreword.
1. See, e.g., Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and
the FirstAmendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 406 (1995) ("Within both
American labor and employment law doctrine, the traditional baseline conception of
the employment relationship is that it is a voluntary (i.e. non-coercive) contractual
relation.").
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workers.2 They also make informal promises through their managers
and other agents who may provide assurances of long-term work, opportunities for training and development, and future promotions or
advancements.
Similarly, employees know that they must do more than simply
show up to work to receive the benefits of employment. Many employers issue personnel handbooks that promulgate disciplinary rules,
company procedures, and policies on everything from tardiness to
conflicts of interest. Some employers also require entering workers to
sign formal documents, such as noncompetes and arbitration agreements, that attempt to contractualize discrete aspects of the relationship. Beyond these official rules, employees understand that they
must comply with other implicit company standards. Employees anticipate that their work obligations will develop and change over time,
and they know they must oblige instructions and assignments that may
exceed the bounds of any static job description.' In return, they expect employers to abide by the letter and spirit of their official and
unofficial promises, exercising managerial discretion equitably and
making exceptions to the company policy where appropriate.
Given the multiple sources of obligation and expectation in the
workplace, it is often difficult to determine what should happen in the
event of a dispute. Which of the parties' promises are gratuitous and
which carry the force of law? In answering those questions, American
courts have historically turned to the rules of private contracts, although they often apply that body of law with some difficulty. Contract law requires mutual assent and the exchange of consideration for
the creation of a binding agreement.4 Many workplace promises,
however, lack these formalities. The substance of whatever commit2. Indeed, key employment benefits, such as health insurance, are often more
important to workers than the amount of their take home pay in making decisions to
accept or remain in a particular job. See Center for Survey Research: Health Pulse of
America, Stony Brook University, at http://www.stonybrook.edu/surveys/HPAAug03.
htm (Aug. 19, 2003) (noting that 71% of non-retired Americans responded that if they
had to look for a job in the coming year, they would prefer a job with health coverage
and lower salary to one with no health coverage and higher salary).
3. In contrast, unions have been able to successfully exploit the inevitable gap
between written rules and implicit obligations in times of labor-management conflict
through the "work-to-rule" job action. See Local 702, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 215 F.3d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(describing electrical worker's "work-to-rule" job action, which included employees
"adhering strictly to all company safety and other rules; doing exactly and only what
they were told; reporting to work precisely on time and parking work trucks at company facilities at day's end (thus precluding employees from responding to after-hours
emergencies); presenting all grievances as a group; advising non-employees to report
unsafe conditions; and advising customers of their right to various company information and of their right to have their meters checked annually for accuracy").
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) ("[T]he formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and a consideration.").
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ment is in dispute may be vague and indefinite, particularly if it is
made orally.5 Indeed some workplace "promises" are not even statements, but are simply implicit in the parties' understanding of how
things work between them.6 Such understandings may even be at
odds with more formal policies of the employer.
Of course, some employer promises are sufficiently specific to suggest an intent to be bound, as where the obligation derives from a
handbook or written policy. In such cases, however, courts may question whether the promise is supported by consideration. At the outset
of a relationship, consideration for employer promises is provided by
the employee's commencing work; the problem lies in unilateral efforts to alter the understanding or impose new obligations after the
fact. Where the employer and employee form a bilateral agreement
for a fixed term of employment, the employer's promises are contractually enforceable and cannot be modified without new consideration.
By default, however, employment is terminable at will, and the relationship is therefore more frequently understood as a unilateral agreement.7 From this perspective, promises endure only so long as the
employer refrains from changing its mind, for the execution of each
unit of work by the employee marks the commencement of a new
agreement under new terms.8 Any long-term commitment is deemed
illusory, negated by the shared understanding that either party can
walk away at any time.9
5. See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916) (finding conversation in which employer offering employee a "fair share of my profits" if employee
addressed backlogged jobs too vague to evidence required meeting of minds).
6. Scholars often refer to such understandings as "implicit" or "social" contracts
of employment as distinguished from the legally enforceable obligations of the parties. See Denise M. Rosseau, Psychologicaland Implied Contracts in Organizations,2
EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTs. J. 121, 123-29 (1989) (articulating differences between social and emotional expectations of individuals in contract relationships and the legal
and equitable principles under which courts enforce select aspects of such
relationships).
7. The doctrine of employment "at will" is generally attributed to Nineteenth
Century treatise writer Horace Wood, and though his analysis has been subject to
dispute, employment at will continues to be the modern default rule of the employment relationship in every jurisdiction except Montana. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 1-4 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing evolution of Wood's "at will"
concept of employment relationships). For the exception to the general rule, see
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1) (2003), which creates "just cause" protection for
employees who have completed an employer's probationary period of employment.
8. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983)
("[W]here an at-will employee retains employment with knowledge of new or
changed conditions, the new or changed conditions may become a contractual obligation .... The employee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer
of a unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave, the
employment supplies the necessary consideration for the offer."); accord Johnson v.
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991).
9. But see W. David Slawson, UnilateralContractsof Employment: Does Contract
Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9 (2003) (criticizing this
interpretation and arguing that the law of unilateral contracts requires employers to
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Whatever the correct interpretation of contract law in such circumstances, courts often resist the conclusion that a disputed employment
promise is gratuitous, particularly in cases involving employers reneging to the detriment of employees. And no wonder. Given the economic significance of work to the individual, as well as the centrality
of work in our society, the promises and commitments of those we
work for play a crucial role in shaping our lives. For many people,
personal happiness, sense of purpose, and sense of success, in addition
to financial security, all depend significantly on their experiences in
their jobs. 10 Employers, likewise, view their relationship with their
workers differently from other exchange obligations they take on in
the course of business. In the contemporary service economy, the success of a company is heavily dependent on the quality of its workforce,
and many employers invest accordingly. 1 Thus, parties on both sides
of the equation are likely to see their connection to one another as a
relationship of mutual dependence-what the law might call a "status"-that exceeds the bounds of its discrete components.
The result is that the law of employment contracts is highly idiosyncratic. Courts frequently find binding obligations in cases where contract formalities are absent, while avoiding enforcement of signed
documents carrying all of the trappings of enforceable instruments.
For instance, courts have intuited binding promises of job protection
based on industry practice and informal assurances and have recognized a cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract for
long-term employment. 12 At the same time, they frequently hold covenants not to compete unenforceable for overreaching 13 and agreeabide by promises of job security made in consideration of employees' remaining on
the job).
10. As Vicki Schultz puts it, "For most people, working.., is a way to contribute
something to the larger society, to struggle against their limits, to make friends and
form communities, to leave their imprint on the world, and to know themselves and
others in a deep way ....
[W]ork isn't simply a sphere of production. It is also a
source of citizenship, community, and self-understanding." Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2069-70 (2003). See also H.G. KAUFMAN, PROFESSIONALS IN SEARCH OF WORK 53-55 (1982) (discussing psychological changes
resulting from professionals' unemployment and impacts on individual and family).
11. Illustrative of this idea is the recent emergence of an extensive business management literature on the importance of developing and maintaining human capital.
See PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, VALUE-DRIVEN INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 13-16 (2000)
(describing origin and development of concept of intellectual capital in business management field from 1980s to present); KARL ERIK SVEIBY, THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 3-8 (1997) (demonstrating high proportion of intangible corporate
assets to market value for major global companies).
12. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (recognizing implied-in-fact contract for job security based on duration of plaintiff's employment, commendations and promotions he received, lack of direct criticisms of his work, assurances given to him by employer, and employer's
acknowledged policies).
13. Most courts evaluating the enforceability of a noncompete contract apply the
general rule that such agreements are void unless they are reasonably limited in scope
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ments to arbitrate void for lack of consideration.' 4 This seeming
inconsistency in enforcement can be explained to some extent by judicial concern for the well-being of workers, particularly those whose
skills do not permit them to diversify the risk of job loss and who lack
bargaining power compared with their employer. 5 The formalized
contracts signed by most workers tend to be non-negotiable form
agreements drafted by their employer that curtail or eliminate workers' rights. On the other hand, employer promises that benefit workers often are made extra-contractually, sometimes intentionally so.
Assuming that such concerns constitute an appropriate focus of judicial decision-making, they are problematic in that they fail to yield a
unifying theory of how courts should apply contract law to employment relationships. The result is that the law of employment contracts
remains a puzzle, unresolved on key issues that greatly affect workers'
lives.
Given this landscape, it is necessary for legal scholars to identify
and tackle the broad theoretical questions that plague the doctrine.
An overriding issue is how to integrate the pieces of a multi-dimensional employment agreement, both with one another and, perhaps
more importantly, with the holistic relationship that they purport to
define. This concern implicates many questions. On the level of contract law, how do written contract terms intersect with oral terms?
With implied understandings of the parties? With external norms?
On the level of social policy, which freedoms should employment law
aim to protect? Freedom of competition for employers? Freedom
from oppression for employees? Or freedom of contract for all parties? On a pragmatic level, how do existing and proposed legal rules
affect the decisions of courts? The strategies of employers and their
attorneys? The real lives of workers? And, on perhaps the most fundamental level of all, what do our responses to the questions posed
and necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the employer. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) ("A promise to refrain from competition ... is
unreasonably in restraint of trade if: (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to
protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed
by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.").
14. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 617-18 (D.S.C.
1998) (finding employer's return promise to arbitrate disputes illusory where employer retained discretion to modify or cancel agreement), affd, 173 F.3d 933 (4th
Cir. 1999).
15. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. 1974) (noting public policy rationale against enforcing noncompete agreements based on "disparity in bargaining power" between employee and employer, where employee,
"fearful of losing his means of livelihood ... contract[s] away his liberty to earn his
livelihood in the field of his experience"); Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (Ohio 1952) (noting that an employee "is
often in urgent need of selling [his labor] and in no position to object to boiler plate
restrictive covenants placed before him to sign .... His individual bargaining power
is seldom equal to that of his employer").
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here tell us both about the nature of contract law and the nature of
employment as a contract?
Such questions call for robust theorizing at the intersection of two
areas of legal scholarship that have a great deal to offer one another.
Contract theory seeks to understand the way in which private parties
structure consensual relationships, including how parties decide what
to include and what not to include in their agreements. It contains
what is now a developed literature on "relational" contracts, longterm or recurrent agreements in which the parties' desire to protect
and preserve their relationship impacts how they perform or respond
to non-performance. 1 6 This inquiry is of significant import to employment contracts, which are highly personal, yet the majority of relational contract literature concerns ongoing commercial transactions
between businesses.1 7 For its part, much of recent employment law
scholarship has focused on the regulatory aspects of the employment
law regime, in particular on the scope of federal discrimination laws
and other statutes that dictate threshold terms of employment. Somewhat less attention has been given to the private dimension of the
employment relationship, including how parties and courts determine
terms and conditions that exceed legally proscribed minimums or fall
outside the scope of public regulation. Employment law scholarship
that does address these aspects of the employment relationship does
not always draw on contract theory. 8
The Articles in this Symposium Issue bring together the scholarship
of contract law and employment law, bridging the gap between these
two bodies of theory and doctrine. Several of the pieces respond to
court efforts to reconfigure the rules of contract law to better suit the
problems of employment relationships. David Slawson's contribution,
for instance, focuses on employer modification of personnel manuals.
16. Relational contract theory refers principally to the idea that the behavior and
expectations of contracting parties are heavily influenced by a desire to preserve their
relationship and foster cooperative behavior. See generally IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (David Campbell ed., 2001); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737 (2000); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
17. But see Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 Buir. L. REV. 763, 769-74, 788-92 (1998) (discussing cases involving implicit promises of employee job security and employer duty of good faith in
illustrating principles of relational contract theory); Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1913, 1929-38 (1996) (using example of employers' voluntary compliance
with "for cause" discharge practices, despite background rule of employment "at
will," to illustrate relationship between internal norms and legal rules).
18. The consistent exception, of course, is the large body of writing that applies
law and economic principles to the employment relationship. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (arguing for
contract at will based on fairness, utility, and distributional concerns). This well-developed discourse could be enriched by scholarship that considers employment contract issues from other ideological perspectives.
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Professor Slawson examines court decisions establishing "new" rules
of contract that permit employers to revoke promises of job security
by revising their employee handbooks. Professor Slawson criticizes
this approach, arguing that basic contract law, properly understood
and applied, can both protect employee expectations and preserve
employer discretion, while at the same time enabling employers who
so chose to make binding promises of job security.
In contrast, Frank Snyder's contribution attributes court manipulation of contract law to a lack of fit between contract principles and
employment relationships. Professor Snyder points out that, historically, employment was considered a legal status, not a private agreement, and that it continues to be a status relationship today despite
modern emphasis on self-determinism. Because of this, employment
decisions sounding in contract law offer only partial solutions to the
problems of employment relationships; at the same time, they create
exceptions of general applicability that make business transactions
costly and unpredictable. Debora Threedy's contribution responds to
Professor Snyder, calling into question the theory that employment
cases negatively impacted the development of contract law. Closely
examining the chestnut case Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, Professor Threedy concedes that the court's strict application of the preexisting legal duty rule in that decision did little to advance the cause
of the plaintiff employees, cannery workers who sought to exert concerted pressure on management. Professor Threedy notes, however,
that the court applied extant contract principles that were not rejected
until the development of uniform commercial law some sixty years
later. In addition, she points out that Alaska Packers' has been recast
as a decision involving the doctrine of economic duress, an area of
contract law in which the decision remains relevant despite the advent
of modern labor law.
Other articles in this Symposium look at the contractual nature of
employment from a multi-party perspective. Michael Green's contribution considers a possible role for unions in addressing the problem
of employer-mandated arbitration agreements. While critics of arbitration have generally sought a regulatory response prohibiting agreements that limit employees' statutory rights, Professor Green searches
for a contract-based solution. He suggests that employees can enhance their bargaining power through collective action and calls on
unions to take an active role in negotiating this aspect of employment
on behalf of their constituencies. In contrast, Orly Lobel looks at the
emergence of a new third party player in modern employment relationships-the temporary employment agency. Her contribution explores the various reasons for employer reliance on third party
employers, which range from the desire to circumvent legal obligations to benign efforts to capitalize on flexibility. Professor Lobel critiques court decisions involving temporary workers for failing to
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acknowledge the triangulated nature of the contingent employment
relationship and calls for a new model of employment contract rights
that enables managerial flexibility while preserving employer
accountability.
The last three articles offer different perspectives on the enforcement of post-employment restraints on competition. Scott McDonald's contribution critiques the current legal framework, offering rich
examples of how costly it is for both employers and employees to operate in an environment where noncompetes are not predictably enforceable. He questions the viability of contract-based solutions,
demonstrating how drafting techniques have failed to overcome existing legal ambiguities, and calls instead for a statutory solution that
creates uniform guidelines for enforcement. My own contribution
looks at the formation of noncompetes rather than their enforcement
and asks whether contract law can be used to close the floodgates that
have unleashed an increasing number of these agreements on the labor market. Drawing on the rules of enforcement of premarital
agreements, I propose enhanced rules of assent, consideration, and
unconscionability that will encourage employers to use such agreements responsibly. Finally, Marlize van Jaarsveld's contribution offers
a South African perspective on the competing policy concerns that
complicate questions of noncompete enforcement. Professor van
Jaarsveld demonstrates how competing influences from British and
Roman-Dutch law converged to create a regime in which the ability to
pursue one's occupation is constitutionally protected, but restraints on
trade are prima facie enforceable, subject to basic public policy
limitations.
To be sure, many questions about the relationship between contract
and employment remain unanswered. The complexity of employment
issues-the inherent tension between public regulation and private ordering, between legal agreements and moral obligations, between business interests and human need-will doubtlessly continue to
challenge courts and legal scholars. The voices collected here offer a
first step toward a richer understanding of the contractual dimension
of employment and employment's influence on contracts in addressing some of the most pressing issues of the contemporary labor
economy.
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